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REFORMING WELFARE THROUGH
SOCIAL SECURITY
Stephen D. Sugarman*
It is unfortunate that discussions of welfare reform almost
never mention Social Security. Although Social Security
contributes to the welfare problem, it also may be used as part
of the solution. When Americans talk about welfare, they
usually envision poor single mothers who receive cash aid
from the program widely known as Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC). Social Security generally is not
mentioned because most people are unaware of the large cash
assistance program that Social Security provides for other
dependent children and their caretakers. Additionally, most
people who are aware of the role played by Social Security do
not imagine that it is connected to the welfare problem.
In this Article, I first want to illustrate the connection
between Social Security and AFDC-to explain the Social
Security program and to demonstrate how it contributes to the
welfare problem. More importantly, I then want to offer a
reform proposal that builds on Social Security as a way to
begin to eliminate AFDC and the current welfare problem.
Simply put, I propose that Social Security should provide
benefits to children with absent parents on the same basic
terms on which it now provides benefits to children with
deceased, disabled, or retired parents.
I. COMPARING SOCIAL SECURITY AND WELFARE
Consider two hypothetical scenarios, the first of which
explains how Social Security's existing benefits for children
and their caretaker parents work. Suppose Jane and Bob are
married and have a two-year-old child, Rachel. Bob, who
* Agnes Roddy Robb Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. B.S.
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works full time, dies suddenly.' Although few people seem to
realize it, regardless of whether Bob and Jane had purchased
sufficient private life insurance to replace Bob's lost earnings,
Social Security provides Bob's survivors with a life insurance
annuity benefit, assuming that he was insured for Social
Security purposes at the time of his death.2
This public life insurance benefit is divided into two parts.
First, Social Security would pay a monthly cash benefit to
Jane for Rachel's support, referred to as the child's benefit.3
The benefit amount would be based on Bob's previous wages
4
and generally would continue until Rachel reaches age
eighteen.5
Second, Social Security would make the following benefit
offers to Jane, referred to as the caretaker parent's benefit: If
you previously were not in the paid labor force, you may
continue to stay at home and care for Rachel and Social
Security will provide you with a monthly cash benefit in
addition to Rachel's.? If you previously worked full time in the
paid labor force, you have the option to quit your job and stay
home to care for Rachel, in which case Social Security will
provide you with the same caretaker parent's benefit available
under the first offer.7 If you decide to continue working, or to
enter into the paid labor force, Social Security will provide you
1. In these scenarios and in the discussion generally, it will be assumed that
the child has lost the support of her father and now depends upon her mother. Al-
though this certainly is not the universal pattern, it is the overwhelmingly common
one.
2. This requires that Bob was either "fully" or "currently" insured. 42 U.S.C.
§ 414 (1988). In order to attain either status, Bob must have a certain number of
'quarters of coverage" in covered employment. Id. § 413. Although it was not true
in the early years of Social Security, today nearly all employment is covered,
including self-employment. Id. §§ 410, 411.
3. Id. § 402(d).
4. Bob's average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) would be calculated and
then would be put into a formula to determine his primary insurance amount (PIA).
Id. § 415(a), (b). As the child of a deceased worker, Rachel's benefit would be 75% of
Bob's PIA, id. § 402(d)(2), subject to a family maximum. Id. § 403(a).
5. Id. § 402(d)(1)(E). The benefits are terminated earlier if Rachel marries
before reaching age 18, and may be continued beyond age 18 under certain special
circumstances, for example, if Rachel is disabled. Id. § 402(d)(1).
6. Id. § 402(g)(1). This benefit, like Rachel's, would be based on Bob's previous
earnings. The widowed caretaker parent's benefit is 75% of the wage earner's PIA,
id. § 402(g)(2), subject to a family maximum, id. § 403(a), and will continue until
Rachel is 16 years old. Id. § 402(s)(1). Note that between the ages of 16 and 18,
ordinarily only Rachel would receive benefits. Jane's benefit would terminate earlier
if she remarries before Rachel reaches age 16. Id. § 402(g)(1).
7. Id. § 402(g)(1).
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with the full caretaker parent's benefit as long as you do not
earn more than approximately $600 a month. If you exceed
that amount, Social Security will reduce your benefit by one
dollar a month for every two dollars you earn, until the benefit
disappears entirely.' Regardless of how much you earn,
however, the child's benefit to Rachel will continue unabated.
Social Security would provide the same child's benefit to
Rachel 9 and would provide Jane with similar options as the
caretaker parent' ° if Bob became totally disabled or was at
least sixty-two years old and retired." Moreover, these
benefits would be paid regardless of whether Bob and Jane
had purchased disability insurance to cover the risk of Bob's
disability or had saved funds for the support of the family in
anticipation of Bob's retirement, for example, through a
pension plan.
Having illustrated how Social Security's dependent child
program works at the individual family level, it is now
appropriate to provide some recent national data on the
program's operation. As of April 1992, Social Security was
paying benefits to more than 1.8 million children of deceased
workers 12 and to nearly 300,000 of those children's widowed
mothers.' 3 Social Security also was paying benefits to almost
1.1 million children of disabled workers 4 and to approximately
200,000 spouses who care for those beneficiary children. 5
Finally, the program was paying benefits to more than 430,000
children. of retired workers' 6 and to approximately 100,000
spouses who care for the beneficiary children of those work-
ers.' v In sum, nearly four million children and caretaker
parents currently are beneficiaries of the Social Security
8. Id. § 403(b).
9. Id. § 402(d)(1).
10. Id. § 402(b)(1)(B).
11. The benefit amounts paid to Jane and Rachel would, in each case, be 50% of
Bob's PIA. Id. § 402(b)(2), (d)(2). Note that this percentage is less than if Bob had
died. See supra note 4.
12. Current Operating Statistics, SOC. SECURITY BULL., Summer 1992, at 91, Table
1.B4.
13. Id. at 92, Table 1.B5.
14. Id. at 91, Table 1.B4.
15. SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SOCIAL SECURITY
BULLETIN-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT 204, Table 5.H2 (1991) [hereinafter ANNUAL
STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT].
16. Current Operating Statistics, supra note 12, at 91, Table 1.B4.
17. ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 15, at 204, Table 5.H2.
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program.'" In dollar terms, as of April 1992, monthly child
benefit awards amounted to more than one billion dollars. 19
About three-quarters of that sum was paid to children of
deceased workers. 20 Benefits to caretaker parents total an
additional two billion dollars annually.2' Hence, the combined
annual cost of Social Security payments to children and their
caretakers is approximately fourteen billion dollars.
Now consider an alternative scenario which contrasts the
fate of children who lose financial support through the absence
of a parent, for example, through divorce. Suppose that Bob
and Jane divorce or separate and that Jane obtains custody of
Rachel. Presently, no Social Security benefit would be
available for Rachel and Jane. Bob likely would be ordered to
pay child support to Jane for Rachel's benefit. He also might
be ordered to pay spousal support to Jane. The two payments
together might suffice to support Jane and Rachel adequately,
even if Jane stays at home and cares for Rachel; although
typically the amount of the payments would require Jane and
Rachel to accept a sharply reduced standard of living.
Moreover, even if the amount of the award is sufficient, there
is a considerable possibility that Bob will not pay the full
amount ordered, or even a part of it. 22 He may disappear from
Jane's and Rachel's lives, stop working, pay initially but then
stop paying, or start a new family to which he will devote his
time and money.
In the event that Jane does not obtain sufficient support
from Bob, she probably will have to continue working or enter
into the paid labor force, even if she does not believe that such
action is in Rachel's best interests. Because Social Security
will not provide any benefits, Jane will not have the options
that she would have had if Bob had died.23 If Jane does work,
her earnings might well be the household's primary means of
18. Of the 3.3 million beneficiary "children" as of April 1992, more than 620,000
were disabled and over the age of 18. Current Operating Statistics, supra note 12,
at 91, Table 1.B4.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Social Security does not report clearly the amount paid to caretaker parents
of beneficiary children, yet estimates can be derived from the ANNUAL STATISTICAL
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 15, at 190, Table 5.F1 and 198, Table 5.F12.
22. Recent estimates suggest that only about one half of the children with
support orders receive the amounts that have been awarded, and about one quarter
receive partial payments. See GORDON H. LESTER, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CHILD
SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1987, at 4 (1990).
23. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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support. If Jane cannot find employment, or if she decides to
stay at home and care for Rachel, then her only other option
may be to apply for welfare benefits under AFDC.
In order to qualify for AFDC, Jane first will be required to
deplete any liquid assets remaining after her divorce or
separation from Bob.24 Such an "assets" test is not imposed as
a requirement to obtain Social Security benefits. Assuming
that Jane and Rachel qualify for AFDC, the benefits they
receive will vary from state to state, but certainly will be less
than the official poverty level for a single mother with one
child.25 By contrast, if Bob had died, their Social Security
benefits would be a nationally uniform amount related to
Bob's past earnings,26 and might well be above the poverty
level. For example, the average individual benefit paid by
Social Security to children of deceased workers was more than
$400 a month in 1991 and 1992 2 7-the equivalent of the
average monthly payment to an entire AFDC family. 2 To
illustrate the contrast differently, rather than receiving an
average of about $400 a month from AFDC, the family benefit
for widowed caretakers and children receiving survivor
benefits under Social Security averaged more than $1100 a
month at the end of 1990.29 The family benefit for children
who alone receive survivor benefits averaged more than $570
a month at the end of 1990.30
The relative generosity of the Social Security programs may
be viewed from yet another perspective. Whereas Social
Security is now paying about fourteen billion dollars annually
to almost four million dependent children and their caretaker
parents, 3' AFDC paid out nearly twenty-one billion dollars to
more than twelve million recipients in 1991, including about
24. States may not permit a family receiving AFDC benefits to have assets of
more than $1000, apart from a home, a modest automobile, burial plots and funeral
arrangements, and real property of which the family is attempting in good faith to
dispose. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(B) (1988).
25. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 102D CONG., 1ST. SESS.,
OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS-1991 GREEN BOOK 597-600, Tables 7, 8 (Comm.
Print 1991) [hereinafter 1991 GREEN BOOK].
26. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
27. Current Operating Statistics, supra note 12, at 89, Table 1.B2.
28. 1991 GREEN BOOK, supra note 25, at 606, Table 11.
29. ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 15, at 204, Table 5.H2.
30. Id. The average family benefit varies substantially depending upon the
number of children in the family. For example, the combined benefits for two
children averaged $899 a month at the end of 1990. Id.
31. See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
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eight million children.32 In other words, AFDC's budget was
only fifty percent greater, even though its caseload was three
times larger.
Additionally, if Jane receives AFDC benefits, the prospect of
combining public benefits and wages from work is much less
attractive than if Bob had died and she was receiving Social
Security benefits. Instead of being able to earn about $600 a
month before Social Security benefits are reduced, Jane and
Rachel would begin to lose their AFDC benefits almost from
the outset.3" AFDC benefits are reduced during the first four
months of employment while under the program at a rate of
two dollars for every three dollars earned and not otherwise
disregarded,34 and thereafter at a rate of one dollar for every
dollar earned and not otherwise disregarded.3 5  Recall that
this is in contrast to the Social Security program, which
reduces benefits by one dollar for every two dollars earned. 6
Put differently, Social Security presents wage-earning recipi-
ents like Jane with what is commonly called an implicit
marginal tax rate of fifty percent; that is, the recipient loses
fifty cents in benefits for each dollar earned. AFDC's implicit
marginal tax rate begins at sixty-seven percent and increases
to one hundred percent after four months of employment; that
is, the recipient loses a dollar in benefits for each dollar
earned.
Another way that Jane might improve her household's
standard of living is through remarriage. Indeed, many
divorced and widowed mothers do remarry.37 If Jane is
divorced and receives AFDC benefits, the price of remarriage
is that she and Rachel would no longer receive benefits under
the program." By contrast, although Jane would lose any
32. 1991 GREEN BOOK, supra note 25, at 614, Table 17 and 620, Table 21.
33. Under current law, the state will disregard $90 of income per month as
deemed "work expenses," up to $175 of income per month to cover child care expenses
($200 in the case of a child under age two), and an additional $30 of income per
month for the first year of employment while under the program. 42 U.S.C. § 602
(a)(8)(A) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
34. Id. § 602(a)(8)(B)(ii)(I)(a).
35. Id. § 602(a)(8)(B)(ii)(I)(b).
36. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
37. Studies have found that more than one third of divorced women remarry
within three years after divorce, and 70% of women with children in their custody
remarry within six years after divorce. See David L. Chambers, Stepparents, Biologic
Parents, and the Law's Perceptions of"Family"After Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT
THE CROSSROADS 102 nn.1 & 2 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma H. Kay eds., 1990).
38. Depending upon her new husband's circumstances, the couple may, in rare
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benefits she was receiving as a caretaker parent if she
remarries while covered by Social Security,39 Rachel would
continue to receive her Social Security child's benefit.
Therefore, other things being equal, marrying a divorced Jane
imposes a considerably larger financial obligation for the new
husband than does marrying a widowed Jane, even though in
most states a new husband does not have any formal legal
obligation to support Rachel unless he adopts her.4 °
In sum, if a child does not obtain sufficient financial support
from his absent father and the child and his mother are poor
enough, they can qualify for AFDC. They will be forced,
however, to live on an income below the poverty level. In
contrast, if a child's working father dies, becomes disabled, or
retires, the child and his mother can qualify for Social
Security benefits and probably will live above the poverty level
either from Social Security alone or by combining Social
Security benefits with the mother's earnings, private insur-
ance, or savings.
A. Historical Background
America has not always treated children with absent fathers
so differently from those with deceased, disabled, or retired
fathers. Neither Social Security nor AFDC existed before
1935, although there were state-level precursors to AFDC,
typically called "mothers' pensions" programs.41 During the
Depression, many of these mothers' pensions programs had
long waiting lists, were depleted of funds, or functioned in only
a portion of a state.42 Title IV of the Social Security Act of
cases, qualify for AFDC benefits under the provisions governing children deprived of
the support of an incapacitated or unemployed (AFDC-U) parent. See 42 U.S.C. § 607
(1988). Because of the various restrictions imposed under those provisions, only 7.6%
of AFDC families were in the AFDC-U category between October 1988 and September
1989. 1991 GREEN BOOK, supra note 25, at 639, Table 31.
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)(1) (1988).
40. See Chambers, supra note 37, at 108.
41. See WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 3-19 (1965); JOEL F. HANDLER,
REFORMING THE POOR: WELFARE POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND MORALITY 11-16 (1972); ROY
LUBOVE, THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 1900-1935, at 92-112 (1968).
42. See COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SEC., SOCIAL SEC. BD., SOCIAL SECURITY IN AMERICA
233-49 (1937).
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193541 created the AFDC program," which was essentially a
partial financial bail-out of state mothers' pensions programs
by the federal government. In effect, if a state enacted a
program of aid for poor children that met certain minimum
requirements, the federal government would pay a portion of
the cost of the program through a matching grant. All of the
states found this arrangement sufficiently attractive and
enacted qualifying AFDC programs soon after the adoption of
the Social Security Act.45
Title II of the Act established the program that we now
commonly to refer to as Social Security.46 Originally, Social
Security existed as a program for retirees and their estates
called Federal Old-Age Benefits,47 commonly referred to as
old-age insurance (OAI). OAI did not provide benefits for the
dependents of covered workers. 4' Thus, if the first scenario
involving Bob, Jane, and Rachel had occurred shortly after
1935, no Social Security survivor benefits would have been
paid to Bob's family upon his death. 49 However, if Jane was
poor enough, she could have qualified for AFDC and obtained
an amount determined by her state of residence. At AFDC's
inception, it was anticipated that the program mainly would
support poor widows and their children and, in fact, it initially
functioned in that way.50
Under the federal program rules, AFDC also would help to
support children whose parents were divorced, separated, or
never married, or whose fathers were incapacitated.5 1 In the
early years of the program, however, there were relatively few
43. Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992)).
44. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, tit. IV, § 401, 49 Stat. 620, 627 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-687 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
45. 1938 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SEC., 75TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT 3 (Comm.
Print 1938).
46. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, tit. II, § 201, 49 Stat. 620, 622 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1988)).
47. See id.; Stephen D. Sugarman, Children's Benefits in Social Security, 65
CORNELL L. REV. 836, 837-44 (1980).
48. See Sugarman, supra note 47, at 847.
49. A lump sum might have been payable to Bob's estate, regardless of whether
Bob was married or had any children. See id. at 842.
50. In the earliest years, more than half of the cases involved deceased father
claims. Stephen D. Sugarman, Roe v. Norton: Coerced Maternal Cooperation, in IN
THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN 365, 371 (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985).
51. The basic statute defines a dependent child as one who "has been deprived
of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home
... or physical or mental incapacity of a parent. ... " 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1988).
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such absent-parent cases.52 One explanation is that divorce,
separation, and childbirth outside of marriage were far less
common than they are today. A second reason is that states
initially were permitted to impose moral requirements in
determining who was eligible for AFDC. Many states adopted
the same practices and requirements utilized under the
mothers' pensions programs, which largely restricted benefits
to "gilt edged widows"-those behaving in a morally upright
manner that suited their assigned social worker. 3 As a result,
if the second scenario involving Bob, Jane, and Rachel had
occurred shortly after 1935, it is far from certain that Jane
and Rachel would have been deemed eligible to receive AFDC
benefits after the divorce, regardless of their financial need.
As a last resort, Jane and Rachel might have been able to
obtain some cash aid from their state's or county's residual
general relief programs, sometimes referred to as "general
assistance."
In any event, the Social Security Act Amendments of 1939"4
changed the picture dramatically. OAI was modified to
emphasize "social adequacy" as much as "individual equity.,
5
Dependents' benefits were added for the spouses and children
of retirees56 and for the widows, widowers, and children of
deceased workers. 7 The program appropriately was retitled
Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Benefits,5" common-
ly referred to as old-age and survivors insurance (OASI).
Through further amendments beginning in the 1950s, the plan
ultimately was expanded to provide benefits to totally disabled
workers5 9 and their dependents ° and was renamed, yet again,
as Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
Benefits," more widely known as old-age, survivors, and
disability insurance (OASDI).
52. Cases involving deceased fathers and incapacitated fathers together
amounted to more than three quarters of all early cases.- Sugarman, supra note 50,
at 371.
53. See BELL, supra note 41, at 3-19.
54. Ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360.
55. See ALICIA MUNNELL, THE-FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 5-8 (1977).
56. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, tit. II, § 202, 53 Stat. 1360,
1364-65 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)-(d) (1988)).
57. Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)-(f) (1988)).
58. § 201, 53 Stat. at 1362.
59. Social Security Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, tit. I, § 103(a), 70 Stat. 807,
815 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 423(a) (1988)).
60. Social Security Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-840, tit. II, § 205, 72
Stat. 1013, 1021-23 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)-(d) (1988)).
61. Social Security Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, tit. I, § 103(i), 70 Stat. 807,824
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1988)).
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An obvious objective of the 1939 amendments was to elevate
widowed mothers and their children from AFDC to Social
Security-a goal that largely has been achieved. As discussed
previously," about 2.1 million children and their caretakers
received Social Security survivor benefits in 1992. Formally,
these caretakers and their children still may be eligible for
AFDC if they do not qualify for Social Security.63 Despite this
potential eligibility, however, cases involving widows and their
children comprised less than two percent of the AFDC caseload
during 1989,64 which in absolute numbers-approximately
200,000 mothers and children-is far fewer than the approxi-
mately 2.1 million widowed mothers and children now receiving
OASDI benefits.
After the 1939 reforms, there was reason to hope that AFDC
largely would wither away as a result of moving widows and
their children onto Social Security. This, of course, has not
happened. Cases involving incapacitated fathers represented
a significant percentage of the AFDC caseload until the late
1950s,65 when totally disabled workers, their children, and their
spouses first qualified for Social Security.66 As a result of these
amendments, the AFDC caseload involving incapacitated
parents is currently small, comprising only three percent of the
total, or approximately 300,000 caretakers and children,
compared with the 1.3 million caretakers and children who
receive OASDI benefits through a disabled worker.68
AFDC's continuation is instead largely attributable to the
caseload explosion involving recipients who are divorced or
separated, or who have never been married. Presently, about
eighty-five percent of AFDC cases are comprised of women and
their children who fit within this category,69 usually referred
to as "absent father" cases. During the 1940s and 1950s,
cultural patterns and state policies limited the number of
absent father cases. Since the 1960s, however, enormous
62. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
63. For example, Social Security benefits may not be available if the husband did
not work in covered employment, or had insufficient quarters of covered wages at the
time of his death.
64. 1991 GREEN BOOK, supra note 25, at 638-39, Table 31.
65. See supra notes 50, 52.
66. See supra notes 59, 60 and accompanying text.
67. 1991 GREEN BOOK, supra note 25, at 638-39, Table 31.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15. These statistics cover the period
from October 1988 to September 1989. See sources cited supra notes 14-15.
69. 1991 GREEN BOOK, supra note 25, at 638-39, Table 31.
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changes have occurred. First, the divorce rate has increased
dramatically from thirty years ago. Second, the out-of-wedlock
birthrate is significantly higher. Third, the poor generally seem
much more willing and able to ask for and obtain AFDC
benefits than they were in the past, mainly the result of several
important developments of the 1960s: the ideology of the War
on Poverty, the civil rights movement, the welfare rights
movement, and the introduction of federally funded legal
services for the poor. Finally, changes in state laws have
increased greatly the number of "absent father" claimants.7 °
B. Expanding Social Security's "Social Adequacy" Function
The Social Security Act has created two classes of presump-
tively needy children-those with deceased, disabled, or retired
fathers who no longer must look to means-tested AFDC benefits
for support, and those with absent fathers who remain
dependent upon welfare. In comparing these two classes, it
must be emphasized that in all instances in which a child faces
the risk of poverty, both the private economy and the private
law may make it unnecessary for the child and her mother to
seek any public income transfers. The deceased father may
have had adequate life insurance; the disabled father may have
adequate disability insurance; the retired father may have
adequate savings or an adequate pension; and the absent father
may have adequate earnings and may pay adequate child
support.
The "social adequacy" provisions of Social Security are
founded on the social reality that many fathers simply do not
have adequate life insurance, disability insurance, savings, or
pensions. Although it is true that the shortfall in each of these
70. For example, during the 1960s, many states had rules that denied a woman
and her children AFDC benefits if their home was "unsuitable." Often, a home was
deemed unsuitable simply because the state disapproved of the mother's sexual
behavior. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 320 (1968); Sugarman, supra note 50, at
374-76. A similar requirement often denied AFDC benefits to a child whose mother
lived with a "man assuming the role of spouse." See Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552,
553-54 (1970). Some states simply sought to deny benefits to women who had
"illegitimate" children while on welfare, on the ground that this proved the unsuitabili-
ty of the home. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. at 322. States no longer may deny
assistance to dependent children "on the basis of their mothers' alleged immorality
or to discourage illegitimate births." Id. at 324.
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respects is less today than it was in 1935, the shortfall remains
substantial and almost surely would continue if Social Security
dependents' benefits were eliminated. Recognizing this clear
social need, Congress provided for a social insurance benefit
through Social Security by establishing a reasonable floor of
support for the children and spouses of deceased, disabled, and
retired workers. The benefit amount is progressive in the sense
that it replaces a larger proportion of a low-wage earner's
salary than of a person whose earnings are comparatively
higher.71 At the same time, because payments are related to
a worker's past wages, the benefit helps to maintain consistency
in a child's relative standard of living after the event that
triggers a loss in earnings.
In other words, although the Social Security child's benefit
is not tailored individually to an absolute need for subsistence
income, the benefit plainly does serve the need for substitute
income when a child can no longer depend upon his father's
earnings. Fathers, of course, can arrange privately for life
insurance, disability insurance, savings, and pensions, but
these serve to benefit their children beyond the base that Social
Security provides. Obviously, some men provide less private
support because they are aware of the role that Social Security
plays. As previously indicated,72 however, the nature of
American lifestyles suggests that many fathers would not
provide for their children even if Social Security did not exist.
When a child is deprived of financial support due to her
father's absence and failure to pay child support, the govern-
mental arrangements are altogether different.73 From the
child's perspective, however, the risks and subsequent needs
are similar. Just as men often die without sufficient insurance,
men also father children only to later divorce or leave the
children's mothers without paying the child support required
of them. Some men may not pay because they become
financially unable to do so or were unable to pay an adequate
sum in the first place. Some men may not pay simply because
they prefer instead to spend the money on themselves, a new
partner, or perhaps new children. Some men may not pay
because of anger and hostility toward the custodial parent.
Still others may not pay because they are never identified as
71. For a discussion of the changes in the Social Security benefit formula over
time, see Sugarman, supra note 47, at 866-68, 876-81.
72. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 23-30.
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the fathers of the needy children, or even if they are so
identified, have never had a support order entered against them
and do not pay voluntarily.74
Since 1974, the federal government has expanded its efforts
to require states to adopt and operate more effective child
support enforcement programs .75 These enforcement programs
have enlisted the support of local law enforcement officers, have
sought to create higher and more standardized support awards,
and have attempted to implement a wide variety of child
support withholding mechanisms, for example, through
withholding from wages and income tax refunds. The child
support shortfall remains extremely large, however. 6
The consequences for children with absent fathers are
troubling. Although other similarly needy children are rescued
by the largely invisible Social Security program, support
through AFDC and absent fathers may be wholly inadequate.
Moreover, the fact that AFDC no longer serves children of
deceased and disabled fathers surely has contributed to the
stigmatization and political weakness of those who must
continue to depend on AFDC for support. That is to say, if
widows and incapacitated wage earners constituted a larger
portion of the AFDC caseload relative to absent parent cases,
opponents of AFDC would be less effective in characterizing it
as a plan for irresponsible women who bear illegitimate
children or who cannot keep their marriages together.7 In this
way, Social Security has contributed to the welfare problem.
II. THE PROPOSED PLAN
The description in Part I of the basic structure of Social
Security benefits for children and their caretakers demonstrates
74. Sugarman, supra note 50, at 372-73, 429-33. It is estimated that about two
in five children with absent fathers were not awarded child support in 1978, 1983,
1985, and 1987. 1991 GREEN BOOK, supra note 25, at 667, Table 3.
75. See.Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE
CROSSROADS, supra note 37, at 169-74. See generally 1991 GREEN BOOK, supra note 25,
at 658-729 (discussing the federally enacted Child Support Enforcement Program).
76. Approximately one third of awarded support is not paid, amounting to
approximately five billion dollars a year. 1991 GREEN BOOK, supra note 25, at 699.
Moreover, this does not account for the 40% of children who were not awarded support.
See supra note 74.
77. More than 50% of the total national caseload of AFDC families falls within
the 'not married" category. See 1991 GREEN BOOK, supra note 25, at 638-39, Table
31.
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how the system might be made available to a large number of
those children currently on AFDC. By amending Social
Security, a meaningful reformation of welfare can be achieved.
The goal is to continue the trend established by the Social
Security amendments in the 1930s and 1950s-moving even
more needy children and their mothers from AFDC to Social
Security.
Suppose that a child deprived of the regular presence of a
parent in the home qualified for Social Security benefits
determined in the same manner as if the absent parent had
died. Suppose further that the child's caretaker parent also
qualified for Social Security benefits determined in the same
manner as if the absent parent had died.78 This Part initially
will focus on how such a benefit program would function and
explain the financial and psychological advantages it would
provide for its beneficiaries. This Part then will consider
whether the new benefit can be understood coherently as an
appropriate object of Social Security and how the new benefit
would be financed. Finally, attention will be given to the
welfare problem that would remain after the adoption of the
proposal and to the plan's political prospects.
A. Financial Advantages for AFDC Claimants
In order to qualify for the new Social Security benefit, the
program generally would require that the absent parent,
typically the father, have sufficient recent attachment to the
work force to be insured for Social Security purposes at the
time of the divorce or separation, or the child's birth if the
parents are not married or living together at that time. I will
assume that the insured status needed to qualify a child for
absent parent benefits would require the same past labor force
attachment of the wage earner that is required for the current
child's benefit.79
Although it is difficult to determine the proportion of AFDC
recipients who would be eligible for Social Security benefits
78. For earlier proposals in a somewhat similar vein, see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS, BACKGROUND PAPERS 442-45 (1970); ALvIN SCHORR,
POOR KIDS (1966). For my earlier, less enthusiastic views, see Sugarman, supra note
47, at 900-04.
79. See supra note 2.
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under this proposal, the share is likely to be large. For two
primary reasons, however, the proportion probably would be
lower than the proportion of widowed mothers otherwise
eligible for AFDC benefits who currently are receiving Social
Security benefits instead. First, there almost certainly is a
higher proportion of absent fathers than deceased fathers who
are not insured for Social Security purposes. Included in this
category are teenage fathers who have never worked and young
fathers who have not yet established a sufficient earnings
record to qualify as insured. Second, the identification rate of
fathers of children born outside of marriage almost certainly
is lower than that of fathers who have died.80
As with current Social Security benefits, the child and the
caretaker parent would be eligible for benefits based upon the
absent parent's past wages. From data already presented
concerning Social Security survivor benefits,8 ' it seems fair to
conclude that in a large number of cases, the new Social
Security benefit would be greater than what the mother and
child currently receive under AFDC, thereby improving their
financial status. For now, I will assume that in cases where
the new Social Security benefit is less than the current AFDC
benefit, the mother and child would be eligible to apply for
AFDC benefits to "top up" the benefits to their previous level.
The caretaker parent thus could stay at home with her child
or enter into or remain in the paid labor force at her option,
facing the same Social Security benefit loss rules that apply in
survivor benefit cases. Perhaps most importantly, the child's
benefit would not be reduced regardless of the mother's
earnings,82 which contrasts sharply with AFDC benefits.83
Similarly, the caretaker's benefit would be reduced using the
current Social Security rate of one dollar for every two dollars
earned after approximately the first $600 in monthly earn-
ings.84 As a result, women currently receiving AFDC benefits
80. Of course, as is the case under the AFDC program, some unmarried mothers
will choose not to name the fathers of their children, even if known. Consequently,
those children will not qualify for the new Social Security benefit. For a general
discussion of the problem of identifying absent fathers, see Sugarman, supra note 50,
at 372-74.
81. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
82. Perhaps this should be reconsidered in cases where the mother earns
substantial income and the social adequacy basis for paying the child's benefit is no
longer served. Cf. Sugarman, supra note 47, at 888 (discussing reform alternatives,
including a change in the earnings test that would reduce the child's benefit when
either parent earns sufficient income).
83. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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would find it far more financially attractive to combine Social
Security benefits and wages than to combine AFDC benefits
and wages.
The irony presented by the current welfare situation merits
discussion. Many people seem to want AFDC mothers to work,
while they appear less willing to pressure Social Security
mothers to do the same. Because of its higher implicit
marginal tax rate,85 however, the AFDC program discourages
voluntary work much more than does the Social Security
program. The proposed plan would end this perverse work
incentive pattern, thereby providing a reasonable basis to
believe that many women now solely dependent upon AFDC
would choose a combination of Social Security benefits and paid
work. It also is worth noting that AFDC recipients who
currently earn modest wages and illegally fail to report their
earnings to the AFDC program could combine the new Social
Security benefit with their current earnings and cease to be
lawbreakers.86
For many women now receiving AFDC benefits, transferring
to Social Security would provide the opportunity to combine the
new benefit with supplemental private support from the child's
absent parent. As a condition of eligibility, AFDC recipients
currently are required, when necessary, to cooperate in
establishing the paternity of a child and in obtaining an order
of child support against that child's father, and to assign that
support award to the state. 7 The state ordinarily collects the
child support payment and remits only fifty dollars a month
to the mother, keeping the remainder, in effect, to pay for the
AFDC benefit the mother is receiving.88 Hence, a child
receiving AFDC benefits is helped very little if the father
actually pays support. In contrast, just as children and their
caretakers can supplement Social Security survivor benefits
with private life insurance or estate assets left by the deceased
parent, they could supplement Social Security absent parent
benefits with private child support payments. This would give
85. See supra text following note 36.
86. See generally JOHN A. GARDINER & THEODORE R. LYMAN, THE FRAUD CONTROL
GAME 123-37 (1984) (discussing the limited effectiveness, high cost, and moral
ambivalence oftraditional "fraud control" programs that require extensive verification
procedures and impose criminal penalties).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(A), (B) (1988).
88. See 1991 GREEN BOOK, supra note 25, at 689-90. The first $50 of monthly child
support received by a household is not regarded as income and therefore does not cause
a reduction in benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(8)(A)(vi) (1988).
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mothers a greater incentive than they currently have under
AFDC to ensure that absent fathers pay the required support.
Because caretaker parents would have various opportunities
to supplement their household's Social Security benefits, there
would be less need for AFDC to "top up" Social Security in
cases where the Social Security benefit is less than the AFDC
benefit.
B. Psychological Advantages
Those mothers who transfer from AFDC to Social Security
should, in general, gain a great deal in self-respect. First, there
would be an end to AFDC's intrusiveness in the form of school
and work requirements, routine social worker supervision, to
the extent that this still exists under AFDC, and inquiry into
assets, none of which occur under the Social Security program.
Public agencies still could offer social, vocational, and educa-
tional services to these mothers, but the programs would have
to be of a high quality in order to attract the voluntary
participation of caretaker parents. Obviously, coercive
intrusion would be appropriate in cases of child abuse or
neglect, but under the proposed plan, single mothers would no
longer be presumed incompetent or unfit in the way that AFDC
now essentially presumes.89
At the same time, because caretaker parents would not have
to face coercive AFDC requirements, they would no longer
suffer one of the main consequences of such
requirements-restricted access to benefits. Rather than
helping recipients finish school or enter into the paid labor
force, as the AFDC requirements purportedly intend, these
rules often serve simply as insurmountable hurdles, which
purge from the AFDC caseload, or otherwise penalize, needy
children and their mothers.9"
Additionally, beneficiaries of the proposed plan may come to
see themselves as recipients of an earned benefit rather than
a "hand out," as AFDC often is viewed, despite its formal status
89. I have long wondered whether mandatory visits by social workers to all
recipients would be tolerated on the ground that such visits are not "searches," even
though compelled visits to AFDC recipients have been approved on this ground. See
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971).
90. See Sugarman, supra note 50, at 403.
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as a legal entitlement. This stronger sense of rightful entitle-
ment holds some promise of securing better treatment by, and
generating greater self-confidence in dealing with, the admin-
istering bureaucracy. At the same time, public criticism of
these caretakers may be reduced sharply because rather than
claiming from a program with a bad reputation, they would
obtain benefits through the Social Security program, which
currently does not receive significant public opposition.
The psychologically appealing quality of Social Security, as
compared with AFDC, would be important to another group as
well. Some women who have not applied for AFDC benefits
because of the attached stigma presumably would apply for the
new Social Security benefit. At a minimum, these women and
their children could improve their financial position because
of the addition of the child's benefit. Further, some of these
women who currently work in the paid labor force rather than
receive AFDC might reduce their employment or quit altogether
when the new Social Security benefit becomes available. In
this respect, they are simply being provided with the same
options now offered under Social Security to caretaker mothers
whose husbands have died.
Finally, because Social Security would provide an opportunity
to combine benefits with wages or private child support, fewer
women who are now receiving AFDC benefits would feel the
need to remarry simply to improve their financial positions.
Again, this would place these women on par with widowed
mothers now covered under Social Security.
C. Financial Advantages for Non-AFDC Claimants
Thus far, the focus of the proposal has been on transferring
recipients from AFDC to Social Security. Another large group
of children also would be affected, however. The new Social
Security benefit would not be limited to AFDC-eligible children
and their caretakers, just as Social Security survivor benefits
for children and their caretaker parents are not restricted to
AFDC-eligible claimants. All children in single-parent homes,
along with their caretaker parents, potentially would be
eligible. Indeed, most working, middle-, and upper-class
couples who divorce or separate could be affected.
Of course, many women apply for AFDC benefits following
divorce, separation, or childbirth outside of marriage, even
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though they previously did not consider themselves poor. Many
other single mothers do not apply for AFDC, however. Through
a combination of their earnings, the child and spousal support
they receive, and other resources, these mothers may find it
unnecessary to turn to AFDC for assistance. This does not
mean, however, that single mothers as a class are financially
well off. To the contrary, the studies of the economic conse-
quences of divorce vividly demonstrate that a substantial
proportion of women and their children suffer financially."'
Therefore, in addition to its promise to solve much of the
welfare problem, the proposed plan also may protect
nonimpoverished women and their children from the sharp
declines in living standards that they face at the time of divorce
or separation, especially in cases where the divorced or
separated fathers fail to pay child support.
It is worth noting that the structure of the proposed Social
Security child's benefit would correspond to the existing moral
and legal norms governing the financial relationships between
children and their absent parents. The new benefit would
reflect the absent parent's past income, just as child support
is calculated to reflect the absent parent's ability to pay based
on his past earnings. In other words, Social Security's commit-
ment to wage replacement dovetails with the belief that child
support should maintain the child's past living standard to
some degree.
D. The Impact of the New Social Security
Benefit on Support Obligations
A critical issue raised by this proposal concerns the interac-
tion of the new Social Security benefit with the child support
obligation of the absent parent. To remain generally consistent
with current Social Security practice, the absent parent benefit
would not be reduced when child support is received. Instead,
such support payments would supplement the benefit in the
same way that life insurance now supplements Social Security
survivor benefits. Simply because child support payments
would supplement the new Social Security benefit does not
mean, however, that states would continue to maintain their
91. See Marsha Garrison, The Economics of Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE
CROSSROADS, supra note 37, at 75.
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private child support obligations at current levels. To the
contrary, if states believe that the support levels currently
imposed are appropriate, it is likely that they would reduce the
initial support obligation by an amount equivalent to the new
benefits received. Alternatively, states may elect to credit the
new Social Security benefit toward the satisfaction of the
support obligation. Under either method, the child support
obligation ultimately imposed upon the absent parent will be
identical.
Regardless of the method selected, both the child's and the
caretaker's benefits under Social Security should be accounted
for when calculating the absent parent's child support obliga-
tion, because these benefits together would be provided for the
purpose of supporting the child. In some households, this will
mean that the absent parent's child support obligation is
covered fully by the Social Security payments; that is, depend-
ing upon the method adopted by the state, either the initial
support obligation would be reduced to zero or the support
obligation would be discharged fully by crediting the Social
Security benefits toward the support obligation.92 These
proposals suggest that states should look primarily to the
absent parent's earnings to determine the child support
obligation. Although some states currently do so, most have
adopted formulae that focus on the earnings of both parents.
93
Hence, the adoption of the new Social Security benefit may
cause many states to rethink their basic calculations of child
support awards.
States should not reduce a spousal support award by the
amount of Social Security benefits in excess of the absent
92. Indeed, some households will receive more from Social Security than from child
support. In that event, although the absent parent would not pay any child support
directly, the child and the caretaker parent would still fare better. Such households
are most likely to be those in which the absent parent has low earnings, where Social
Security would replace those earnings at a higher rate than they traditionally would
be tapped for child support.
In some situations of course, the new Social Security benefit would not fully cover
the child support obligation, and the absent parent would be obligated to make up the
difference. That shortfall likely would be especially large in cases involving wage
earners whose earnings are well beyond the maximum covered by Social Security.
The maximum creditable amount in 1993 is $57,600. 1 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH)
1 12,001, at 1017 (Oct. 29, 1993).
93. See Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discretionary Justice in Family Law:
The Child Support Experiment, 70 N.C. L. REV. 209,229 (1991). See generally JANICE
T. MUNSTERMAN, NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: A
COMPENDIUM (1990) (compiling state child support guidelines).
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parent's child support obligation, nor should states, under the
alternative method, treat the excess Social Security benefit as
discharging a spousal support obligation by an equal amount.
Unlike Social Security caretaker's benefits, spousal support
should not be awarded for the support of children, nor should
its amount depend upon the presence of children. Rather,
spousal support awards should be based upon claims that are
independent of current parenting status, even though it may
be theorized that the underlying justification for spousal
support rests upon a woman's traditional role in caring for
children, or upon the specific spouse's prior parenting activities
that might have ceased by the time of the divorce or separation.
The topic of spousal support, the underlying basis of which is
currently the subject of much controversy, is beyond the scope
of this Article.
What should happen if the caretaker parent earns wages
above approximately $600 a month, thereby causing a reduction
in the Social Security caretaker's benefit at the rate of one
dollar per two dollars in wages earned? This loss should not
increase the child support obligation of .the absent parent.
After all, the child is already better off because the caretaker
parent's extra earnings will increase the household's financial
position, despite a partially offsetting loss in Social Security
benefits. In other words, depending upon which method is
adopted, states should either reduce or treat as discharged the
absent parent's child support obligation by the full amount of
Social Security benefits to which the child and the caretaker
parent would be entitled if the caretaker parent was not
employed.
At the same time, the fact that the custodial parent earns
wages should not reduce the absent parent's child support
obligation, at least not until the caretaker parent has earned
wages sufficient to exhaust her own right to Social Security
caretaker's benefits. Otherwise, the implicit marginal tax on
the caretaker parent's earnings would be sufficiently large-a
fifty percent loss of the Social Security benefit, positive income
and Social Security tax obligations, and the loss of child
support-to make it financially pointless for the caretaker
parent to earn moderate wages above $600 a month.
Relatively minor technical questions could arise in cases
where the divorced couple is awarded joint physical custody of
their child and where the higher-wage earner is awarded
primary custody and child support normally would not be
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imposed on the noncustodial parent. Although these matters
require additional analysis, it seems sufficient to assume that
where custody is shared equally, the couple could choose the
earnings on which the benefit is to be based, and that the plan
would generate benefits from one parent's absence regardless
of the couple's relative earnings.94
E. Is the Proposed Social Security Benefit
Coherent Social Insurance?
The argument for a new Social Security benefit has rested
from the beginning on the equal treatment of claims made on
behalf of children of absent parents-children whose innocence
and potential need is the same as that faced by children of
deceased, disabled, and retired parents. In other words, from
the child's perspective, there is a need for financial support
when a parent has left the household, whether because of
death, divorce, or separation. Nevertheless, thinking about this
new benefit as insurance reveals at least three potentially
significant differences between the risk guarded against by the
proposed benefit and the risks that Social Security currently
insures against: the fact that the absent parent is still
working, the possible "moral hazard" that the proposal creates,
and the arguably different desires of wage earners who pay
Social Security "premiums."
First, whereas deceased, disabled, and retired workers are
not expected and usually are not able to continue to earn
wages, this generally is not true of working parents who are
absent from the household. In other words, in instances of
divorce or separation, there is no risk of earnings loss against
which insurance generally is necessary. Some may believe that
this difference alone is fatal to the entire notion of having
Social Security cover the financial risk of absent parents.
There remains, however, the risk of income loss for the
household now comprised of the child and the caretaker parent.
The policy question is whether Social Security's social adequacy
objective should include dealing with such a risk.
94. In fact, joint physical custody is rare, as is primary custody by fathers. See
Robert H. Mnookin et al., Private Ordering Revisited, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE
CROSSROADS, supra note 37, at 37, 52-55.
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It may be argued that there is no real need for earnings
replacement when earnings are not interrupted, which
ordinarily is the case in absent parent situations. From the
child's perspective, however, there is indeed a risk of interrup-
tion. It is hardly determinative that the absent parent might
provide support privately. After all, each of the risks presently
covered by Social Security could, in principle, be covered
privately. We know as a society, however, that many workers
simply will not buy sufficient life or disability insurance and
will not save enough to support themselves and their families
in their retirement. Social Security insurance thus responds
not so much to market failure as to human failure. The
justification for the new Social Security benefit similarly rests
upon the social awareness of another human failure-that
many absent fathers simply do not pay any or enough child
support.
Consider, under the existing regime, the situation in which
parents separate or divorce, the absent father pays no child
support, and then later he dies. At the time of his death, his
child becomes entitled to a Social Security child's benefit.
There is a certain irony in this situation; only now that the
absent father has died does the child begin to receive the
support that he should have received all along. Under the
proposed regime, both types of ordinary parental obligations
to the child-support when the father is living and life insur-
ance at the father's death-will be satisfied partially through
Social Security.
A second potential difference between the existing Social
Security benefits for children and the proposed benefit concerns
what usually is termed "moral hazard;" that is, the tendency
of insurance availability to lead to a behavioral change that
causes the loss. Although it is possible that some people cause
their own deaths or disabilities95 because they know that Social
Security benefits will be available as a consequence, it is
unlikely that this happens very often. Most people want to live,
and to do so without a disability. It is highly unlikely that the
prospect of receiving Social Security benefits is sufficiently
enticing to overcome their preferences for life and health.96
There may be a greater concern, however, that people will
be encouraged to separate because of the existence of Social
95. This could occur through either deliberate action or other intentional risk-
taking behavior that leads to death or disability.
96. Social Security retirement benefits are, of course, another matter. For
retirees, Social Security operates more like forced savings than insurance.
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Security insurance covering absent parents. There are two
ways to analyze this possibility. First, consider the situation
from the father's viewpoint. If today he is somewhat discour-
aged from leaving his wife and child because of the child
support obligation that he would have to pay, then a reduction
in his support obligation, other things being equal, will increase
the likelihood of his departure. In short, the existence of the
insurance may change his behavior in a way which increases
the likelihood that the insurance will be used-a moral hazard.
If this behavioral response by fathers is considered socially
undesirable, it may be possible to counteract the behavior
through the method by which the new Social Security benefit
is funded, for example, by allocating the cost of claimed benefits
to the absent fathers. On the other hand, it is not entirely
clear whether a man who wishes to terminate his marriage, and
who would do so but for the financial burden that leaving will
impose upon him, ought to be encouraged to remain married.
This quite different perspective has, in turn, different
implications for the funding of the new Social Security benefit.
Second, consider the situation from the mother's viewpoint.
If mothers currently remain in marriages because of the fear
that child support, even if ordered, will not be paid, then the
new Social Security benefit may encourage more mothers to end
their marriages. Once again, the existence of the insurance
may increase the occurrence of the triggering event. As with
fathers, however, it is not clear that this is socially undesirable.
How healthy is it for a woman to be tied to a marriage because
of the fear of poverty? Thus, what some may term a moral
hazard risk can be redefined. From the mother's viewpoint at
least, the new benefit can be seen as providing some insurance
against the financial risk that, upon separation, the father of
her child will not pay sufficient child support.
A quite different concern is that couples who otherwise would
prefer to stay together will be enticed to separate because of
the financial attractiveness of the new Social Security benefit.
Although this result may be socially undesirable, such behavior
is unlikely to occur frequently because of the emotional and
financial benefits couples generally gain by living together.
Additionally, because financial incentives already exist under
the AFDC regime for couples to separate,97 it is unlikely that
97. AFDC usually requires an absent parent. See supra note 38 and accompanying
text.
SUMMER 1993] Reforming Welfare Through Social Security 841
large behavioral changes would occur with the introduction of
the proposed absent parent benefit.
A parallel analysis can be made with respect to the decision
to bear children. For example, a pregnant woman living alone
may have a greater incentive, other things being equal, to bear
an additional child if the new Social Security benefit were
available. Yet this possibility also currently exists under the
AFDC program, a charge frequently levelled against the
program by its critics.9" The empirical evidence suggests,
however, that AFDC does not have any significant impact on
the birthrate.99 Thus, it is unlikely that the new Social
Security benefit, although larger, would have a substantial
behavioral effect either.
A third difference between the existing Social Security child's
benefit and the proposed absent parent benefit concerns the
desires of workers. As workers become disabled or approach
death, they typically regret not having bought private insurance
for their children and, therefore, are grateful for having been
required to arrange for such insurance through Social Security.
For parents who live apart from their children, the picture is
more complicated. Some, of course, will be happy to have Social
Security insurance to assure that their children's financial
needs are met. Others presumably would just as soon forget
about their children's financial well-being; and hence, we might
conclude initially that such parents would not want the new
benefit. Yet, once the absent parents' legal obligations to those
children and the increasingly effective child support
enforcement mechanisms are considered, even uncaring absent
parents may be pleased to be part of a system that at least
helps to discharge their financial responsibilities.
The stronger objection to this form of insurance seemingly
would come from those who do not anticipate becoming divorced
or separated while their children are minors. Those workers
might object to the idea of having to insure against a risk that
they are not concerned about, especially when they have to pay
the same "premium rates" as others. Such an objection would
be especially strong from those who have not fathered any
children and who do not intend to become fathers. Nonetheless,
98. See, eg., CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980,
at 17-19 (1984).
99. See DAVID T. ELLWOOD & MARY J. BANE, THE IMPACT OF AFDC ON FAMILY
STRUCTURE AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS 4 (1984); see also David T. Ellwood & Lawrence
H. Summers, Is Welfare Really the Problem?, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1986, at 57, 67-73.
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it is essential to understand that this type of objection has
carried no weight with respect to the existing Social Security
child's benefit. Regardless of whether a worker has children
or, if so, wants to insure them against the risk of his death,
disability, or retirement, the worker is required to carry such
protection as part of his Social Security package. Workers in
low-risk jobs and with few children pay the same amount, on
the same terms, as those who engage in extremely dangerous
activities and have many children. Hence, that a worker is
unlikely to have a personal need for the insurance would seem
to be an insufficient objection to the idea of divorce or
separation insurance provided though Social Security.
Some people may find it personally offensive to have Social
Security provide financial protection against the risk of divorce
and parenthood outside of marriage based upon moral
objections to such lifestyles. They may not want to be part of
a system which to them symbolizes society's acceptance or
endorsement of divorce and single parenthood. Although this
outlook cannot be rejected as illegitimate, the same objection
could be made to the AFDC program. Perhaps the reply from
these objectors would be that at least under AFDC, we
stigmatize claimants who behave in these socially "undesirable"
ways. Of course, one goal of the new program is to end that
stigmatization. This debate represents a clash of values which
can hardly be expected to lead to consensus, and signals at
least one source of likely opposition to absent parent benefits
through Social Security.
A less passionate objection to the proposed benefit is that
insurance should not be available for risks that people
voluntarily cause to occur. Such an objection is not based
simply on moral hazard concerns, but more broadly on concerns
that the program will no longer function like insurance.
Divorce and separation, in this analysis, simply seem too willful
relative to disability and death. Indeed, whereas life and
disability insurance are available in the private market, divorce
insurance is not. It must be emphasized once again, however,
that from the viewpoint of the child, having an absent parent
is rarely voluntary, and hence is something that children, if
they had the financial resources and could decide rationally,
well might wish to insure against. Therefore, this objection
reflects a belief that the absent parent benefit would operate
not as insurance, but rather as a transfer payment, and one
that other workers should not be required to help finance, at
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least when absent parents can bear the financial burden.
Dealing with this concern requires an analysis of the method
by which the new Social Security benefit would be funded.
F. Financing the New Absent Parent Benefit
If Social Security is to provide both child's and caretaker's
benefits in absent parent cases, difficult choices will have to
be made about the funding of those benefits. There are three
basic alternatives. First, the benefit could be funded in the
same manner as existing Social Security benefits-through a
uniform payroll tax imposed on employees and employers. This
approach would make the benefit most like insurance. At the
time of need, the absent parent would be asked to pay no more
than any other working person.
A second, contrasting approach would be to separate the
funding of the new benefit from the existing OASDI scheme and
to require individual absent fathers to reimburse Social
Security for the benefits paid to their children. The justifica-
tion for this approach is that although social insurance may be
necessary from the child's viewpoint, it is not equitable to
socialize the cost of the insurance when the triggering event
is under the absent parent's control and is unrelated to a loss
of earnings. Under this approach, the benefit would function
more like AFDC. In effect, society would agree to advance the
amount necessary for the new Social Security benefit, but then
would seek reimbursement from the absent parent, dollar for
dollar, to the extent feasible.
A third approach would fall somewhere in between these two
extremes. Absent parents whose children obtain Social
Security benefits would pay more, either individually or as a
group, into the Social Security system than would the ordinary
contributor, but not to the full extent of the benefits paid to
recipients. For example, all absent parents whose earnings
records were the bases of benefit payments could be subject to
an additional percentage of tax on their earnings.
Alternatively, individual absent parents could be required to
reimburse Social Security for a percentage of the benefits that
were paid out based upon their earnings. Similar intermediary
funding arrangements also could be imagined.
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The choice among funding alternatives may be influenced
particularly by projected behavioral responses.'00 For example,
allocating the cost of claimed benefits primarily to individual
absent parents would counter the fear that the new benefit
would stimulate couples to end their marriages, either through
genuine breakups or separations feigned for the purpose of
obtaining benefits.
An alternative way to examine the funding issue is from a
gender-based perspective, although on balance, the solution
from this viewpoint seems indeterminate. In one sense, it may
seem fair that women workers, as part of the collective
workforce, contribute through regular payroll tax contributions
to the funding of the new absent parent benefit because, in
practice, women will be the primary recipients of the new
caretaker's benefit. In another sense, however, it may seem
unfair to require women to contribute to the funding of a
benefit that rarely will replace their wages, but instead will
serve primarily to satisfy what is now understood to be fathers'
obligations. The same objection could be made, however, to the
existing Social Security survivor benefits, which replace the
earnings of a higher proportion of men than women.
In the end, faced with the wide variety of considerations
raised by the funding issue, it may be preferable to await
reaction to the proposal in general before making a choice
among funding alternatives. Until a decision is made on the
proposal in general, it is not clear that states can decide
sensibly whether to increase the support obligations they
impose on absent parents. Specifically, although it may be
assumed that the states consider current support levels to be
appropriate, if the new Social Security benefit were not funded
primarily by payments from individual absent parents, the
states well might conclude that higher support levels are
desirable. Nonetheless, these are issues which may be left open
for further debate.
A broader question regarding funding is the likely cost of the
proposal. Before the plan becomes a serious political
possibility, its cost would have to be examined in detail.
Several preliminary points can be made, however. First,
although OASDI costs would increase, AFDC costs would
100. See supra text accompanying notes 95-99.
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decrease. Admittedly, there almost surely would be a
significant net increase, absent unexpectedly substantial
earning behavior by single parent caretakers. A large increase
in public spending, however, does not necessarily imply either
an increase in the federal deficit or a danger to the financial
solvency of Social Security. To begin with, a reduction in AFDC
costs would have a positive impact on federal and state budget
deficits. Further, although the OASDI fund currently is
running an enormous surplus of tens of billions of dollars a
year," 1 this surplus should not be viewed as an available source
of funding for the new benefit. Rather, this surplus will be
needed in the future to pay retirement benefits to the baby-
boomer generation and should be left to accumulate. 10 2
Nevertheless, a variety of income sources could be tapped to
provide funding for the new benefit. If dollar-for-dollar
payments were required from absent parents, there would not
be a significant net financial difference from the current
system, at least for many families not currently on AFDC. For
those families, Social Security would function essentially as a
collection and disbursement agency. For AFDC families and
families in which absent parents currently are not paying what
they owe, a primary concern is whether Social Security would
be more effective than existing state agencies at collecting child
support payments. In any event, there are sure to be financial
shortfalls which would have to be funded by a general Social
Security tax, unless complete general revenue financing is
adopted for this part of the plan, presumably on the ground of
savings in AFDC costs. If the new benefit is to be funded
entirely by a general Social Security tax, the primary issue is
how large that new tax would be. Although a definite figure
cannot be provided at this stage, it is important to emphasize
that the amount may well be within what most workers would
favor paying in light of the benefit protection that they would
obtain.
101. The fund is projected to be able to pay benefits for approximately 50 more
years. See Actuarial Status of the Social Security and Medicare Programs, SOC.
SECURITY BULL., supra note 12, at 36.
102. Whether it is a good idea to accumulate this fund, and whether the fund is
in any sense meaningfully being accumulated when Social Security "invests" the fund
in the national debt by acquiring governmental securities are complex issues which
will not be explored here.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 26:4
G. Which Children?
To whom should this new benefit be made available? More
specifically, the ability of stepchildren, adopted children, and
children born outside of marriage to qualify for the new benefit
must be addressed. Under the Social Security rules applicable
to children of deceased, retired, and disabled workers, a child
whose biological parents are divorced or separated would
qualify without a further showing of actual dependency upon
the absent parent at the time of the divorce or separation.
10 3
A child born outside of marriage presently qualifies for Social
Security benefits based upon a biological parent's insured
status if one of the following tests is met: the child is able to
inherit from the insured parent under state law;10 4 the parents
have gone through an invalid marriage ceremony; 15 the insured
parent has acknowledged the child in writing; 10 6 or a paternity
or maternity determination or child support order has been
entered against the insured parent.'0 7 If none of these tests are
met, the child may still claim benefits if she can present
sufficient evidence of parenthood and actual dependency
through support from, or by living with, the insured parent.
0 8
The same general requirements presumably would apply to the
new absent parent benefit.
Are there respects in which these rules might seem unfair?
There are two rather different situations to consider in cases
where a child's parents never married. In the first situation,
consider the father who has lived with his child for some time
and then has ended the relationship with the child's mother.
In that event, claims for the new benefit would be analogous
to those made in Social Security disability or death cases where
the father had acknowledged paternity in writing or had a
paternity or support obligation entered against him during the
time he had lived with the child.
In the second situation, consider the father who has never
lived with his child. In this situation, an absent parent benefit
could be sought from the time of birth. This, of course, rarely
103. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(3), 416(e)(1) (1988).
104. See id. § 416(h)(2)(A).
105. Id. § 416(h)(2)(B).
106. Id. § 416(h)(3).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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occurs in death cases, and typically does not occur in retirement
and disability cases, although "afterborns" are entitled to
benefits. The existing Social Security principles would permit
the child born outside of marriage to qualify for the new absent
parent benefit if she can inherit under state law, there was a
ceremonial marriage, or the father was supporting the child at
the time of the birth. This seemingly is an appropriate
outcome. What if none of these elements are met, but instead,
a support order is entered or a written acknowledgement of
paternity is signed at some point after the child's birth?
Although exact parallels cannot be drawn to other Social
Security benefits available to children, I believe that the child
should be entitled to absent parent benefits at that time and
should not suffer unduly from a delayed legal identification of
his father.
In cases where the parents never married, the focus thus far
has been on the child's benefit. Certainly, as a policy matter,
when the child qualifies for benefits, the caretaker parent
should as well. Yet this would be a departure from current
Social Security practice, which provides caretaker benefits to
legal spouses only.1 °9  This discriminatory treatment of
unmarried mothers was attacked unsuccessfully in Califano v.
Boles." If the adoption of the new absent parent benefit
provides an occasion for overturning the rule upheld in the
Boles case, a decided social gain, in my judgment, will have
occurred.
Under the current regime, an adopted child who is claiming
benefits based upon the adopting parent's earnings is treated
as a biological child."' Additionally, a stepchild of the mother's
new husband is entitled to claim based upon her biological
father's account." 2 This also would apply to the new benefit;
after all, such an approach is central to the proposal. The
current regime provides that if a child is adopted by her
stepfather before the child's biological father dies, retires, or
becomes disabled, the child's future entitlement to Social
Security benefits based upon the biological father's earnings
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1) (1988). Spouses, widows, and widowers are defined
as those who: are recognized as such under state law, can inherit under state law,
or went through a ceremonial marriage in good faith even though the marriage later
is deemed invalid. Id. A cohabitant does not meet any of these tests.
110. 443 U.S. 282 (1979).
111. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d), 416(e) (1988).
112. See id.
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is terminated. On the other hand, once the child starts drawing
benefits based upon her biological father's earnings, a subse-
quent adoption by her stepfather would not terminate those
benefits."' Whether a stepparent adoption should terminate
the proposed absent parent benefit is a difficult question.
Under the current rules, because the father necessarily will be
absent and the child likely will be drawing benefits before the
stepparent adopts, that adoption would not terminate the Social
Security benefits."14  This result is intended so as not to
discourage such adoptions. On the other hand, because state
law traditionally curtails the biological father's support
obligation at the time of adoption by the stepparent," a policy
favoring parallel treatment to that practice would call for
terminating the absent parent benefit.
A child also currently may claim Social Security benefits
based upon her stepfather's account, provided that she is living
with or supported by her stepfather at the time of his death,
disability, or retirement." 6 Should the child likewise be
allowed to claim benefits based upon her stepfather's account
when he divorces or separates from her mother? On the one
hand, although empirical studies show that residential
stepfathers generally support their stepchildren," 7 neither law
nor custom supports the notion that they must provide support
following the breakup of their marriage with the stepchild's
mother." 8 From this perspective, stepchildren probably should
not be allowed to claim absent parent benefits based upon their
absent stepfathers' earnings. Yet, there is a growing belief
among commentators that stepfathers, at least those who have
taken on a strong parenting role, should have support duties
and perhaps even visitation or custodial rights with respect to
their stepchildren after the end of their marriages to the
children's mothers." 9 Consistent with this outlook, perhaps
absent parent benefits ought to be allowed in the event of the
separation or divorce of a child's mother from his stepfather.
20
113. See id. § 402(d)(3).
114. See id.
115. See IRA ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 361 (2d ed. 1991).
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(4) (1988).
117. See Chambers, supra note 37, at 105-06.
118. See Sarah H. Ramsey & Judith M. Masson, Stepparent Support of
Stepchildren: A Comparative Analysis of Policies and Problems in the American and
English Experience, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 659, 671-72 (1985).
119. See Ramsey & Masson, supra note 118, at 709-11.
120. To be consistent with the usual rules governing other Social Security benefits
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H. The Remaining Welfare Problem
Of course, there will be some children with absent parents
who will not be served adequately by the proposal advanced
here. As indicated earlier, some single parents will not qualify
for the new Social Security benefit because of insured status
problems or because of an inability to link the child to a specific
earner. Others will qualify for only a very low benefit. What
might be done about them? One solution is simply to leave
them wholly or partially dependent upon a more residual AFDC
program. Although this solution may be the easiest and most
straightforward, it may not be the most desirable. Those
families remaining on AFDC may be stigmatized even more
severely because of an expansion of the earlier pattern of
moving "more deserving" single mothers and their children from
AFDC to Social Security. In any event, there currently is wide-
spread dissatisfaction with long-term dependence upon
AFDC. 1
21
Perhaps these families could qualify for some new program,
such as transitional aid intended to promote greater long-term
independence through the provision of financial, vocational, and
educational benefits for a limited period of time. President
Clinton has advocated a similar proposal.
122
An alternative approach would be to provide these families
with a uniform minimum Social Security benefit based on
family size rather than on the past earnings of ar absent
parent. This strategy is sometimes referred to "blanketing
in,''123 and its aim would be to reduce stigmatization by having
all absent parent claimants deal with the same bureaucracy.
Under this approach, Social Security essentially would provide
a guaranteed level of child support for all children with an
in these situations, a child entitled to benefits on more than one individual's earnings
record (the absent biological father's and the absent stepfather's) ordinarily would
receive payment based upon the earnings record which yields the largest benefit. See
1 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 12,331, at 1095-3 (Oct. 28, 1986); id. 12,367, at 1157-5
(Jan. 6, 1992). In any case, if benefits were based upon a stepparent's earnings, I
assume that the current regime's durational marriage requirements would apply. For
these requirements, see 42 U.S.C. § 416(e), (k) (1988).
121. See JOEL HANDLER & YEHE ASm NmF, TE MORAL CONSmmCION OF PoVEmy:
WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA 201-21 (1991).
122. See Jason DeParle, Idea of Curbing Welfare Gets a Tour and an Earful, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993, at A24.
123. See JosEPH A PEcImA E1'T AL, SOCIAL SECURIy-: PERsPEC'vs FOR REFORM 104-09
(1968).
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absent parent. 124 If this alternative proved successful, it also
might be utilized to provide Social Security benefits to all
children of disabled or deceased parents, thereby blanketing
in most of the relatively small number of AFDC cases where
the wage earner is dead or incapacitated and the household
either does not qualify for Social Security disability or survivor
benefits or qualifies for such a small benefit that AFDC support
is also needed.
These reforms admittedly would not eliminate the problem
of child poverty. Some children, for example, would continue
to suffer because of the unemployment or low earnings of the
able-bodied parents with whom they live. Although in principle
unemployment insurance, minimum wage laws, and the earned
income tax credit are intended to deal with these needs, they
often fall short in practice. It may be possible to deal with the
needs of these children through Social Security, thereby making
the child's benefit more like a universal children's allowance
of the sort provided in most industrialized nations, but not in
the United States.'25 Such an analysis is beyond the scope of
this Article.
CONCLUSION
Three final issues must be considered. First, adding the
proposed benefit to the Social Security system potentially risks
stigmatizing all Social Security benefits available to children,
or indeed all of Social Security. Moreover, that risk probably
is increased as the Social Security Administration becomes
more involved in what is, in effect, child support enforcement.
This ultimately may become a question of how much social
adequacy freight the OASDI train can carry. Although OASDI
ought in principle to be able to carry the added burden of the
absent parent benefit, whether it can in reality remains to be
seen.
This brings to the fore a second issue-the politics of the
proposal. On the one hand, poor single mothers generally are
thought to be politically weak. Yet, in view of recent reforms
124. For a related proposal for publicly guaranteed child support, see Irwin
Garfinkel & Marygold S. Melli, Maintenance through the Tax System: The Proposed
Wisconsin Child Support Assurance Program, 1 AUSTRALIAN J. FAM. L. 152 (1987).
125. See Sugarman, supra note 47, at 904-05.
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in child support and its enforcement, divorced women with
children, either on their own or with and through their
advocates, appear to be an increasingly effective lobbying group.
Further, despite recent federal changes in the AFDC program,
many believe that the welfare problem is far from being
solved. 126 Add to this the desirability of removing AFDC costs
from state and federal budgets and there is a potentially
powerful political alliance in favor of the proposed plan.
Because an increase in the Social Security tax rate would be
unpopular with business, some methods for funding the new
benefit would generate more opposition than others. Perhaps,
unlike past practice, any addition to the Social Security payroll
tax could be imposed solely upon employees-a solution that
perhaps makes further sense if differential obligations are
established for absent parents. Additionally, advocates of the
elderly, who are most concerned about the financial stability
and integrity of Social Security's obligations to retirees, might
be concerned about adding any new Social Security benefits.
On the other hand, child welfare groups which have long
pushed for a broader "children's allowance" might well embrace
the plan. What is needed is public discussion and further
policy evaluation of the general idea of the proposal.
The third and final point is that the formula for calculating
the new absent parent benefit need not be identical to that used
for calculating existing Social Security benefits. Perhaps upon
closer examination, the current formula will be considered too
generous or too modest. To endorse the proposal in general
certainly does not require a commitment to all of the details. 127
What is important now is to determine whether the argu-
ments presented here convince thoughtful people that the core
idea is both attractive and imaginable-that Social Security
reform may hold the key to welfare reform.
126. See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 121, at 230-41.
127. For example, perhaps the Social Security child's benefit should not be based
upon the earnings of the parent, but should instead be uniform in amount.
Alternatively, perhaps it would be desirable to reduce the amount of the benefit paid
when there are one or two children, but in return increase the amount paid by raising
the family maximum when there are more children. For discussions of these issues,
see Sugarman, supra note 47, at 868-71, 888-98.

